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Parent Abuse: Can Law Be the Answer?
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This article reviews the different forms of legal interventions which may be available to
address parent abuse. It seeks to examine the evidence as to which are actually used
currently and the problems which are inherent in them. We do this both by examining
the statutory basis of the existing potential legal remedies and reported cases relating
to those provisions, and by drawing on evidence from a small-scale study of relevant
professional workers in one city. We conclude that while recourse to the police, and
hence potentially the criminal justice system, is most frequent in practice, the criminal
justice system is not suited to tackling the issue. Other interventions, such as anti-social
behaviour orders and injunctions, also reveal problems. Law struggles to find an effective
response to such a complex problem. Notwithstanding the acknowledged limits of law
in changing behaviour, we argue that law could be used more effectively to reduce the
incidence and impact of parent abuse.
Keywords: Children, parent abuse, law, youth justice, injunctions.
I n t roduct ion
Law has been used over the last twenty years to add new constraints on, and responses
to, the behaviour of children and young people outside the home. It has also been used
as a tool in a ‘remoralisation’ project to encourage parents to take more responsibility
for the behaviour and well-being of their children (see, for example, Day Sclater and
Piper, 2000; Hollingsworth, 2007; Koffman, 2008). This trend can be seen, for example,
in developments as diverse as the expansion of law to tackle anti-social behaviour and
the use of procedural and substantive family law to give increasingly clear and urgent
messages about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parenting (see, for example, Eekelaar, 1999; Reece,
2005). Yet parent abuse is a construct which, we contend, is almost entirely absent in
various legal realms: in public law relating to child protection and children’s services, in
private law relating to inter-parental disputes, in criminal law relating to children who
offend and in civil law relating to those who behave anti-socially. ‘Adolescent-to-parent
violence does not fall within official definitions of domestic violence and the problem
has remained largely unarticulated within the fields of youth justice, domestic violence,
policing and criminology, particularly in the UK’ (Condry, 2010).
It has been suggested that the law itself was ‘part of the failure to construct mother
abuse as a problem which needs to be addressed’ (Hunter et al., 2010: 283). Our objectives
in this article are more limited. We return to the different forms of legal interventions which
may be available and seek to examine the evidence as to which are actually used currently
217
Caroline Hunter and Christine Piper
and the problems which are inherent in them. We do this both by examining the existing
legal remedies and reported cases, and by drawing on evidence from relevant professional
workers in one city, referred to below as City X (see Nixon, this volume, for details of the
research).
We are aware that there are limits to what law can achieve in any sphere of national
and international life1 and this is particularly so with regard to the family, where notions
of the ‘private realm’ are still widely held.2 However, while legal remedies will not
always be the way to address parent abuse, it is unlikely that relevant statutory agencies
will develop clear policies and procedures without a legal framework. We contend that
existing criminal justice responses are neither adequate nor desirable, we argue that law
is a pre-requisite for resources to be made available and used. Without a legal framework,
abused parents – and their abusing children – will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
access support or protection.
The nature of child to parent violence and the existing research is dealt with elsewhere
in articles in this themed section (see Nixon and Hunter, this volume). This article focuses
on the responses to the typical situation when the parent – usually, but not always, the
mother – is (repeatedly) abused by their adolescent child; the abuse may be physical
and/or emotional and/or financial, and it usually entails an adolescent child who not
only wishes to control the parent/child relationship – as do of course many non-abusing
adolescents – but also does harmful acts to achieve control (see further the discussion in
Hunter and Nixon, this volume). The very fact that parents are expected, in law and by
society, to be in control as the dominant partner in an unequal parent–child relationship
makes it more difficult for parents to admit to a lack of control. This also makes it more
difficult to apply to parent abuse those provisions in law which is premised on equal
partnerships.3 This normative confusion may, in conjunction with the nature of the child’s
actions towards a parent, account for the current focus on youth justice ‘remedies’.
The cr im ina l jus t i ce sys tem
By far the most common response by workers in City X to questions about how young
people who were abusing their parents came to the attention of services was to refer to
parents calling the police. This was also sometimes suggested as the advice that parents
would be given if they sought help from other services.
Well what I found was that young people perhaps had come to the attention of the police, the
parents had perhaps phoned the police as perhaps a cry for help, even their last resort, felt they
could no longer manage the situation, and young people were often arrested and charged for
common assault or for criminal damage and that’s what it showed on their charge sheet if it
came to court. (Senior parenting practitioner)
This is perhaps not surprising. Evidence suggests that criminal and youth justice
responses seem to be the dominant response in England at the moment, largely for
pragmatic reasons (see, for example, Holt, 2009; Robinson, 2011). Further, the Youth
Justice System (YJS) is often mandated to investigate family circumstances which might
reveal such abuse. For example ‘Before making a youth rehabilitation order, the court
must obtain and consider information about the offender’s family circumstances and the
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likely effect of such an order on those circumstances’ (Criminal Justice and Immigration
(CJI) Act 2008, Sch. 1, para. 28).
If young people are channelled into the criminal justice system, the response will be
based on the aim of the YJS of reducing the offending of the young person (Crime and
Disorder Act (CDA) 1998, s.37(1)) whether through ‘help’ (rehabilitation) or punishment
(just deserts, containment, deterrence). Certainly, there are many voluntary and mandated
opportunities for the young person to be offered help via the work of the Youth Inclusion
and Support Panel (YISP) and Youth Inclusion Programme (YIP) for the young person
deemed to be ‘at risk’, as well as on referral from a police warning to the youth offending
team (YOT) (see CDA 1998, ss.65–66). Also being phased in are youth conditional cautions
(CDA 1998, s.66A), extending the use of this pre-court option to those under eighteen.
The conditions can include attendance at specified times and places and can be for
the purpose of rehabilitation (s.66A(4)(b) and (5)). However, warnings and conditional
cautions can be used only if, inter alia, the authorised officer has evidence that the child
or young person has committed an offence, that the child or young person has admitted
the current offence (CDA 1998, ss.65(1) and 66B) and that he or she has not previously
been convicted of an offence.
If these options are unavailable, or if the offence is deemed too serious for diversion
to a pre-court disposal, then the young person could be prosecuted, say, for one of
the offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. On a first (non-serious)
conviction at the youth court, the outcome will normally be a referral order, meaning that
the young person is referred to the youth offending panel (YOP) to agree a programme of
preventative (rehabilitative) interventions.
However, these options introduced in and since 1998 restrict the ‘chances’ given to
a child: police reprimands (given before warnings) and warnings are normally limited in
their application to one ‘go’ at each, whilst a referral order potentially entails a return to
the court for failure to agree preventative interventions or failure to complete what has
been agreed.4 If the young person has exhausted these chances then, if being dealt with
primarily as an offender, he or she will be prosecuted and, on further appearances at
the youth court, could receive a community sentence (now the new youth rehabilitation
order – YRO) or, ultimately, a detention and training order. The court can attach to the YRO
(Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.177, as amended) one or more of the fifteen requirements
specified, and so, for example, the young person could be subject to a supervision or
programme requirement to address the abusing behaviour or to an exclusion or prohibited
activity requirement to protect the abused parent.
Further, the court can specify the child lives elsewhere, including in local authority
accommodation (CJI Act 2008, s1(i) and (j) and Schedule 1 para 17), so providing a respite
for the abused parent for the maximum six months allowed by the Act. However, there is
a rub here in that the court cannot include a local authority residence requirement unless
it is satisfied that ‘the behaviour which constituted the offence was due to a significant
extent to the circumstances in which the offender was living’ (para 17(3)(a)). Whilst that
would apply where there was inter-generational abuse, the implication is that the parents
are at fault in allowing such circumstances, and so any respite for the abused parent
comes at the cost of stigmatisation.
The complexity of the relationships in child to parent violence also means that parents
are often reluctant to allow interventions which remove the child from the home. One
social worker based in the youth offending team recounted:
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she’d actually brought police in because he’d smashed house up and gone for her . . . but . . .
they bailed him not to return to house, but he then became sixteen and where can he go? And
we had to get him bailed back to house. I had to mediate with her cos she were terrified of
what would happen to him; we placed him in bed and breakfast and she said, ‘he’s not used
to that, he’s streetwise but he’s not used to not living with us’.
The above options all focus on the offender, although a minority have a direct and
immediate effect for the abused parent. There are, however, options which focus on the
parent, notably attendance at a parenting programme. This could be offered as a voluntary
place on a course run by a youth offending team (YOT) or the parent could be subject to
a voluntarily entered parenting contract. However, the ‘voluntary’ nature of these options
should be interpreted in the light of consequences for non-cooperation. For example,
the parenting contract was put on a statutory footing in 2003 and non-compliance has
implications.5 Alternatively, a parenting order could be imposed (see Condry and Miles,
this volume, Holt, 2009).6
The criminal justice system usually provides a stark divide between the perpetrator
and the victim. For most interviewees in City X, there was resistance to seeing matters
in these terms. However, for the senior parenting practitioner, who had also worked
in the youth offending service, the particularly difficult position of parents was clearly
recognised:
When parents are hospitalised because of the way in which their children behave towards
them, it shows you that sort of level [of violence] but I think it’s also that awful guilt you carry
as a parent, I’m the parent, I should be in control here and I’m also responsible for this child so
I’ll phone the police because I feel that I can no longer manage this situation, they get arrested
so I feel guilty about it, I feel guilty . . . because I couldn’t manage the situation, I then go to
court and support them at court, if it’s criminal damage and my landlord decides to take any
action, I end up with a bill, if it’s felt that a parenting order may be appropriate, I then get
served with a parenting order and it escalates and escalates. I then support my child through
the intervention perhaps with the youth offending service so it’s lots of commitment from the
parent who in turn is being the victim in all this.
The parent’s feelings of guilt also vividly illustrate the success of the ‘remoralisation’
and ‘responsibilisation’ policy agenda to which we referred at the beginning of this article.
The parent feels it ‘must’ be their fault.
The possible youth justice responses reviewed above raise the question as to whether
it is appropriate to allow the further development of responses to child to parent abuse
to take place within the criminal justice system. The advantage is that the YJS is involved
in developing expertise and programmes in relation to parenting (but see Condry and
Miles, this volume) and the ‘investing in children’ agenda under the Labour government
encouraged early intervention projects and funnelled resources to preventative schemes
(see Piper, 2008: chapter 7). It is clear that some families were being referred to these in
City X.
There are, however, clear disadvantages, notably the criminalisation of the young
person. Whilst there is some merit in attaching to parent abuse the symbolic – and
possibly deterrent – value of being treated as an offence, criminalisation is not in the best
long-term interests of children and is also likely to lead to unhelpful feelings of guilt in the
parent. The addition of parenting orders also stigmatises the parent. These issues again
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pinpoint the question of the aim of intervention: to ‘reform’ or punish the child, remove
the child to protect the parent, remove the parent or ‘educate’ the parent? Further, those
developments which focus on both child and parent often bring together family and youth
justice policies in a way which may extend the ambit of criminalisation (Koffman, 2008:
120–1; Vaughan, 2000).
Civ i l i n junc t i ve remedy?
It may, therefore, be better to assess whether a civil order could be used to restrain a child
and protect a parent.
Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) are currently available to the courts in relation
to anyone aged ten or over in England and Wales via the civil jurisdiction of a magistrate or
in the criminal court following conviction (‘CRASBO’). Police, housing associations, local
authorities can apply for an order. The definition of anti-social behaviour in the CDA 1998
is relevant to the parent abuse issue: it is behaviour ‘in a manner that caused or was likely
to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ (s1(1)(a)); the order must last at least two years, and
the presumption is now that parenting orders and individual support orders (ISOs) will
be added to ASBOs so that ‘help’ might also be available to parent and child. However,
they would currently probably not be available for parent abuse situations because the
behaviour must be ‘to one or more persons not of the same household as himself’ (CDA
1998, s1), although R (Rabess) v. Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2007]
EWHC 208 (Admin) suggests a way this can be applied. In that case where there was
domestic violence between partners, the imposition of an ASBO was upheld on appeal
because of the effect on neighbours of their behaviour (see Burton, 2008).
It should be noted, however, that in Rabess, the appellant was an adult and the
allegations were both ways. Thus, ASBOs were issued against both the appellant and his
partner, and as the partner did not live in the same home, she was banned under the terms
of her ASBO from coming to his home. The ASBO against the appellant prevented him
from ‘using abusive, insulting, threatening or intimidating language or behaviour towards
[his partner], and secondly using or threatening violence against her’. On appeal, the
terms were varied to add the phrase ‘within sight or hearing of a person not of the same
household as the appellant’. As the judge made clear, if the threats were whispered to
his partner, there would not be a breach of the ASBO; ASBOs are not intended to protect
victims within the same household. It seems unlikely that the current Government’s
proposals to replace the ASBO and the Anti-social Behaviour Injunction (ASBI – see
below) with a Crime Prevention Injunction and a Criminal Behaviour Order (see Home
Office, 2011) would make any difference to this as it is intended to retain the reference
to ‘persons not of the same household’.
It may be noted that none of the practitioners in the study referred to ASBOs as a
potential way of dealing with the issue. Nor did they refer to any other form of injunctive
remedy that applicants could take. There is evidence of local authorities, as in Rabess,
using anti-social behaviour and other tools to deal with issues of domestic violence. The
ASBI is another measure open to local authorities and other social landlords in cases of
nuisance and annoyance related to the landlords’ role as a housing provider (see Housing
Act 1996, ss.153A – 155). In Accent Foundation Ltd v. Lee [2007] EWCA Civ 665 an
injunction was obtained against the adult respondent because of his violent behaviour
towards his mother and sister. The injunction banned him from entering the locality in
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which his mother and sister lived or from threatening violence or harassing people living
in the area.
A different legal approach was taken in A Local Authority v. DL [2010] EWHC 2675
(Fam). An elderly disabled couple were being abused by their adult son. The allegations
included verbal threats, physical violence and extremely controlling behaviour such as
preventing them leaving the house. The authority applied for an injunction under both the
inherent jurisdiction of the high court and Local Government Act 1972, s.2227 effectively
to prevent him molesting his parents. The argument of the authority that other potential
remedies (an application to the Court of Protection under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
an application for an ASBO, an application for an ASBI) were not applicable was accepted
by the court. The court granted the injunction under its inherent jurisdiction, but also found
that arguably it could have been granted under s.222.
Some of the conflicts which interviewees perceived as felt by parents in City X were
also apparent in this case:
[The mother], it appears, is worried that if steps are taken to remove DL from the property he
might at worst commit suicide or that, at best, she might lose contact with him. Furthermore,
the local authority acknowledges that whilst Mr L is more critical of DL’s behaviour, he, Mr L,
would be unlikely to want to take steps in opposition to his wife’s wishes.
Despite the fact that the parents did not wish to take any action against their son,
the key issue for the local authority was that it owed a duty to the couple as ‘vulnerable
adults’. In the examples recounted by respondents to the research, there were also clear
instances where the parent being abused was vulnerable (e.g. because of mental health
problems). The legal duties towards vulnerable adults are much less clearly defined than
those towards children (Law Commission, 2010). It is perhaps not surprising that social
workers employed to deal with child protection did not see cases through the murkier
prism of adult protection, although one articulated it this way as an issue: ‘If it’s so serious
a risk obviously I see it, it’s an adult safeguarding issue’ (Social worker: youth offending
team).
What is noticeable about both these cases is that the perpetrators, although acting in
a child to parent relationship, are adults. It is much easier to take injunctive action against
adults than those under eighteen. The courts should not grant an injunction against an
under eighteen unless there is a clear means of enforcement, which in the majority of cases
there will not be (see G v. Harrow L.B.C. [2004] EWHC 17 and the discussion in Hunter,
Nixon and Parr, 2010). While the ASBO permits legal action against children, it is not
designed to deal with domestic situations. While other injunctive relief may technically
provide a way forward, it is not designed to be used against children. However, in either
case it is not clear that the complexity of the relationship between parent and child can
be unravelled through such simple black and white legal forms.
Domest ic v io lence leg is la t ion
It may be that family law would be a better option therefore, using occupation and non-
molestation orders provided by the Family Law Act 1996. But, again, these are injunctive
orders which are generally not used or usable in relation to those under eighteen years.
It is, therefore, unlikely that a parent could apply for an occupation order excluding
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the child (see ss.33 and 62(3)(d)). Even if the court could entertain such an application,
s.33(7)(a) and (b) would preclude an order if the court believes the child would suffer
significant harm through exclusion from the family home and that harm was greater than
the harm being suffered by the applicant parent.8 The non-molestation order under s.42
of the Act theoretically might be available given that the parent is an ‘associated person’
who can apply for the order. Again, however, the court must have concern for the ‘need
to secure the health, safety and well-being’ of any relevant child.
Not only would this option be deemed inappropriate by the judiciary, it is also
unlikely to be taken up by abused parents. The research respondents were able to draw a
clear distinction between taking action for domestic abuse against adult perpetrators and
taking it against children. This again relates to the complexity of the relationship between
parent and child:
it’s unlike a partner relationship where you’ve got domestic abuse, it’s far more complex than
that because it’s your child, and the guilt you feel that they’re attacking you and the amount
of physical abuse you’ll absorb before you’ll go and do something about it because you feel
guilty for their behaviour and that’s what they’re trying to say to me but can’t always articulate
it. (Social worker: youth offending team)
Ch i ld law
Interviewing social workers inevitably meant that where interventions were being used,
the underlying legal power of the authority came into play. Many local authorities run
parenting programmes and, as the child to parent violence was most frequently seen as
a failure of parenting (see Nixon, above), a common response was to refer parents to
such programmes. Such interventions are covered by the Children Act 1989, s.17, which
imposes a limited ‘general duty’ to assist children in need. As it was put by Ward L.J. in R
(on the application of G) v. Southwark LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 540: ‘the duty is performed
by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs. Given
that there is a wide range of choice, it has to be inferred that there is power to do one
or more of many things to meet the general duty.’ In order to facilitate this duty, local
authorities must comply with those set out in Schedule 2 to the Act. None of these is
directly relevant to the case of parent abuse; indeed the duty in para. 10 that:
Every local authority shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable, where any child within
their area who is in need and whom they are not looking after is living apart from his family –
(a) to enable him to live with his family; or
(b) to promote contact between him and his family,
if, in their opinion, it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote his welfare
would seem to sit behind the reluctance to take steps to separate families.
Paragraph 7(a)(ii) of that schedule is more helpful in that it enjoins the local authority
to take reasonable steps in order, inter alia, ‘to reduce the need to bring . . . criminal
proceedings against such children’. However, the courts have endorsed the fact that s.17
is a general duty and that the local authority has considerable discretion. These limits to
the duty mean that any services which are provided are very susceptible to cuts. Local
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authorities must act in cases of significant harm to the child. However, taking the ultimate
step of taking children into care under 1989 Act, s.31 was something that social work
practitioners were very reluctant to contemplate.
I went to a case management panel where you present your case and you say ‘I think this
would make the threshold for proceedings’ or they make suggestions as to what else you can
do and they were reluctant to say ‘let’s remove these boys’ because of their age because you
certainly wouldn’t be looking at adoption, they’re not adoptable, you’d be looking at either a
residential unit cos you’d probably struggle with foster care . . . you’d be looking at residential
and it would probably make them worse so you have to think about all those things, we would
be really really reluctant to move them but obviously if it had to be done. (Front line social
worker)
A care or supervision order may only be made in relation to a child under seventeen
years of age and if the court is satisfied (Children Act 1989, s.31(2)):
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to −
(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not
being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or
(ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.
Section 31(2)(b)(ii) would appear to be applicable, though it is rarely used. If the
threshold is reached, the court must decide whether to make an order and whether to
make a supervision or care order.9 The child could live at home under either order (and
thereby s/he and the family could receive help and support) but a care order gives the
local authority parental responsibility and the power to place the child elsewhere. The
social workers interviewed in X City, occasionally considered that the behaviour was so
serious in terms of the violence that was being perpetrated that the only way forward was
for the child to be placed into secure care.10 This, however, had its drawbacks and was
only contemplated in cases of severe violence.
Conc lus ions
The nature and extent of parent abuse is considered in other articles in this themed section.
The problem which we have sought to pose here is whether an appropriate intervention
can be found using existing English law?
Looking at the existing statutory provisions some are, or could be, used to intervene
in child to parent abuse. Only recourse to the criminal law was suggested or apparently
routinely used by those interviewed. While this might give access to support for the child
to address the behaviour, it is done in a context which constructs the child as a criminal
and the parent as responsible for the behaviour. Further, the criminal action towards
the parent will often not be the key for criminal justice intervention. Unless there is a
proven outcome in terms of a reduction in other offending by the child or young person
concerned, there is likely to be a lack of resources and the lack of willingness to expend
resources.
Other provisions were seen as simply unsuited in their current legal form and
use. Some will require legislative modification, others might be capable of relevant
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interpretation by the courts. However, these legal forms do not seem able to address
the complexity of the need for an on-going relationship between the parent and the child.
An intervention also needs to balance safeguarding the adult parent with providing an
outcome that is in the best interests of the child. Similarly, dealing with the issue through
a child social work paradigm, while it may give access to some support services, does
so on the basis that the failure is one of parenting. It will rarely address the need to
protect the parent. One of the front line social workers interviewed in the study clearly
recognised that our current legal framework was inadequate, and did not provide a basis
for intervention:
But again to me that raises questions again about legislation and policy that’s made, and Acts
that’s made because it’s so wrong, that’s almost saying ‘well if your husband or partner attacks
you or vice versa we’ll arrest ‘em but it’s ok for your child to do that’ and again it comes back
to what message is it sending to that young person, it’s saying ‘yeah that’s fine’ and then that’s
giving them a feeling of being more in power over that relationship but again it’s legislation
needs to be changed cos it’s not acceptable, that’s a hard choice for a parent to make, to have
your own child arrested, but it’s about skills for later life, that they’ve got to take responsibility
for their actions and that’s all we hear, ‘you’ve got to take responsibility for your actions and
you need to work and you need to do this and do that’ all these messages from government but
when it actually comes down to implementing any of it it’s ‘oh but it’s a different rule because
that’s your son or daughter’.
We are not sure that we have come any closer to finding an answer. The current legal
framework does not provide encouragement or compulsion for the release of resources
to enable the complex intervention which is required to provide protection and support
for the parent and rehabilitation for the child. We are not of the view that criminal law or
injunctive solutions provide a way forward. It might be possible to provide an amendment
to Sch.2 of the 1989 Act to impose a duty on local authorities to take reasonable steps to
support parents who are abused by their children. New guidance on the use of Children
Act 1989, s.31 to provide a structured and possibly mandated intervention could be
encouraged. This would not, however, define the nature of the intervention. The interviews
with practitioners indicated that parents only generally seek help when the problem has
become entrenched and reached a point of crisis. This of course may be too late.
Given the current economic situation, it is unlikely that there will be more investment
in services to respond to a harmful situation which is not yet seen as a social problem.
Historically and now ‘Governments have, in practice, been reluctant to promote measures
which require new or increased expenditure on children; parliaments have sometimes
proved similarly reluctant to pass such measures and the courts have often shown timidity
when interpreting legislation about children and families’ (Piper 2008: chapter 1). The
difficulty stems from our views about parenting and families such that parents are blamed
rather than the children and their parents being provided with the necessary support.
Notes
1 See for example, Sarat et al. (2005) (in relation to states in transition); Lustgarten (1986); Smart
(1989).
2 See, for example, Boyd (1997) and Diduck (2003).
3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight.
225
Caroline Hunter and Christine Piper
4 The law is now in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, ss.25–26.
5 Section 27 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 mandates the court, when exercising discretion
to impose a parenting order under s.26 of that Act, to take into account ‘any refusal by the parent to enter
into a parenting contract under (a) section 25 in respect of the child or young person, or (b) if the parent
has entered into such a parenting contract, any failure by the parent to comply with the requirements
specified in the contract’.
6 Parenting orders were introduced in England and Wales by CDA 1998, ss.8–11 and the Anti-Social
Behaviour Acts of 2001 and 2003 widened their scope.
7 Section 222 provides:
(1) Where a local authority consider it expedient for the promotion of the interests of the inhabitants
of their area –
(a) they may prosecute or defend or appear in any legal proceedings and, in the case of any civil
proceedings, may institute them in their own name.
8 This section applies where the applicant has a legal interest or matrimonial home rights in the
dwelling.
9 The local authority can apply for either order but the court retains its discretion to decide which
is in the best interests of the child.
10 The local authority would need to apply under the Children Act 1989, s.25 using the criterion that
an order was required because ‘if s/he is kept in any other description of accommodation s/he is likely to
injure her/himself or other persons’. The child should normally be over thirteen years of age and in care.
Otherwise the authority needs the permission of those with parental responsibility or must apply also for
an interim care order.
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